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COMMENT
Louis H. POLLAK*

D EAN HYAN, friends: It is a great privilege to participate in a conference

honoring Judge Halpern. And it is of course deeply fitting both that we honor
him by meeting .to discuss problems of civil rights-problems which so deeply
engaged the Judge's mind and heart-and that this conference is held under the
auspices of the Law School with which the Judge was so closely identified. As
this conference bears witness, Buffalo Law School is one of those centrally dedicated to fostering those uses of law which can help to realize our democratic commitments. The character of this School is one of the lasting memorials to Judge
Halpern. But it also testifies to the distinguished leadership of Dean Hyman. As
the Dean nears the end of his decanal term, I am happy to have this opportunity
to salute him.
Dean Hyman has indicated, in his very generous introduction, that my role
as commentator on this evening's papers-however that role may have been
originally conceived-has been skewed a little. Let me explain why: Up until yesterday morning I was quite hopeful that, as commentator-whatever that may
be-I would be permitted an advance view of the papers I was to commentate
(if you will excuse the expression) upon. To be sure, none of the papers was in
hand. But at least I had a phone call yesterday morning from Dean Ferguson's
secretary promising me that a massive tome was on its way to New Haven. Yet
when I stopped at my office this morning, en route to the airport-no tome.
Well, how would you feel? I felt discriminated against. But, remembering
that the law proceeds only upon due inquiry, I sent out my field examiners to the
New Haven Post Office to track down the Ferguson manuscript. A few minutes
later they were back with a reply from the Postmaster: "If Dean Ferguson sent
Pollak a paper through the mail, we'll produce it or write one ourselves." And, sure
enough, five minutes later one of those red-white-and-blue mail wagons trundled
up to -the Yale Law School door and delivered what was alleged to be the Fergu-

son opus. I grabbed it, drove to the airport, and settled down to read Dean Ferguson's text on the flight to Buffalo. And a splendid -text I found it to be, all
garnished with fifty-eight numbers designating footnotes. But there were no footnotes. So, once again, I felt discriminated against. After all, I'd received only one
of the three papers, and only the text of that. But then, still in mid-flight, I
reasoned it out to myself that I'd misunderstood the dimensions of the role Dean
Hyman and Professor Schwartz had contemplated for me. It was sheer megalomania that had led me to suppose I was to commentate upon the Ferguson and
Feild and Hill papers. My assignment was the Ferguson paper, and only the text
of that; and another heavy-domed scholar was to commentate upon the footnotes.
But when I arrived at this dinner I discovered I was in error. Dean Hyman
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indicated that he expected me to deal with all three papers-and he made it fairly clear that he didn't think my contribution would be any the less meritorious
for not having seen two of the papers. I was trying to decide whether the
Dean's observation was just routine courtesy (and if so, to whom) when John
Feild came over to greet me-a document in one hand and a bourbon in the
other. I'm afraid I mixed them. What I'm trying to say is that, though I absorbed a good deal of the Feild paper, I'm not sure that the absorption process
was wholly useful.
At that point Professor Schwartz came in bearing on his back what turned
out to be the collected works of Herbert Hill. I sampled pages; then chapters;
and then, in my desperation, whole volumes. And, as I was trying to think of
how to locate and climb the central summit of the Hill, I was reminded of an
experience which befell my colleague, Boris Bittker, some nine thousand years
ago when he was law clerk to Jerome Frank. One Friday afternoon Judge Frank
handed Boris a draft opinion which he proposed to hand down the following
Monday. Boris said, with law clerkly diffidence, "Judge, this is a pretty substantial opinion-sixty-eight pages long. I wonder whether you would be willing to
let me take it home over the weekend and see if I could whittle it down a little
bit." Judge Frank said, "Of course, Boris, if you want to spend your weekend
that way." Boris did and came in proudly on Monday morning with a seventeenpage restatement compressing the Judge's opinion. He handed it to the Judge
and the Judge said, "Give me a little while to look at it, won't you?" He retired
to his chambers and emerged ten minutes later: "Boris, what you've done is
first-rate. We'll add it on at the end of the opinion."
And now that you know the legislative history of my appearance here this
evening, I shall proceed to commentate. First, I'd like to address myself to Dean
Ferguson's paper:
Dean Ferguson has strongly emphasized the paramountcy of federal interest
in the whole question of racial discrimination in employment. He's exactly right,
of course. We start with the integrated nature of our economy-if not of our
employment picture. We are compelled-if we really mean to deal with these
problems seriously and with substantial effect-to rely heavily on the national
power in all of the aspects which Dean Ferguson so clearly articulated; so I'm
not disagreeing with anything I understood him to say.
My qualifications are only with respect to what he did not say-at least what
I did not hear him say. Actually, I doubt that he will disagree with what I will
add by way of addendum-and it may sound like a small thing, but it seems to
me a reservation of considerable consequence. In stressing the importance of
federal regulation, whether through the President's executive power unaided by
legislation or through the whole elaborate programmatic regulation that a federal
fair employment practices law would give us, I would urge that we not forget,
or sort of discard as not worth bothering about, the segments of the employment
picture which are beyond federal control. I mean "beyond" in two senses:
71

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
First, I suppose there is an area that's constitutionally beyond federal control. If we think hard enough--or if we get our students in Constitutional Law
I to think hard enough-it is possible to isolate certain kinds of businesses that
probably don't have any impact on interstate commerce at all. There are icecream parlors that are not on interstate highways. There are barbershops that
have three chairs which do not cater to people moving back and forth across
state lines. And I think it worth being concerned about barbershops. (Tonight
I'm not -talking about whom the barbershop caters to. We all remember hearing
ad nauseam how difficult it is for a white barber to learn -to cut Negro hair. But
I can't believe we whites are wholly incapable of learning this skill. This seems
to me a technological problem that we ought to be able to lick in time. Tonight,
however, I'm more concerned about the converse of the problem.) In most cities,
barbers' scissors do not seem to be handled by people who are not white. And
the barbershop is only one of many very small businesses throughout the country
which, collectively, employ hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people-far
too few of whom are Negroes.
Moreover, even within the range of what the federal government constitutionally can reach, the most vigorous programs conceivable-programs designed
by Clyde Ferguson and John Feild and administered by Herbert Hill-are not
going to cover anything like the full sweep of possible federal fields of control.
That, after all, is why the National Labor Relations Board set up jurisdictional
limits.
My point is that "the limits of effective legal action" may be far broader
when policed at the state level and yet again at the municipal level.
Now Mr. Hill has very challengingly asserted the ineffectiveness of local
regulation-at least the ineffectiveness of state regulation. He hasn't really
addressed himself to-although I'm sure it's included in his general indictment
-the possibilities of municipal regulatory action. I respond immediately to this.
I live in a city which is at this moment considering the establishment of a
municipal commission which, among other things, would administer-within the
city limits of New Haven-the state of Connecticut's fair employment, public
accommodations, and fair housing laws. And the chief reason why it should be
possible to persuade the New Haven Board of Aldermen to do this is because
the Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights has not been able to do the statewide job that we would want it to do.
Why? Perhaps for many of these reasons adduced by Mr. Hill. But
assuredly for the reason that nobody can police Connecticut on a biennial
budget of $190,000.00 with a staff of four field investigators. Now those figures,
I thought, were fairly pathetic, but they certainly don't look so bad when
measured against the figures compiled by Messrs. Feild and Hill as to states
which claim .to be even larger than Connecticut. California, for instance.
Now are these meager budgets the fault of the California Commission or of
the Connecticut Commission? Of course not. These budgets are, instead, an apt
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.COMMENT
measurement of our inability, as political communities, to elect legislators who
will commit a meaningful quantity of tax dollars to support regulatory programs
of this sort.
In short, if California has a staff of only 35 to 50 or whatever to administer
its state antidiscrimination laws, that's because, collectively speaking, California
doesn't really care very much about this kind of a program. Now there may be
added problems-there may be internal problems of administration such as
those Herbert Hill and John Feild have discussed, and my guess would be that
much of this criticism is justified. For example, everything that John Feild said
about how he would want to structure a state commission or a national commission seems to me entirely right. On the other hand-and here I am particularly concerned with the Hill paper-I want to file one important caveat.
Mr. Hill finds it significant that Pennsylvania and New York are-and are
increasingly-centers of mass Negro underemployment and unemployment. The
significance which Mr. Hill sees is that these are states which have been purporting to enforce their fair employment practice laws. The apparent "ergo" is
that such laws are useless, or perhaps even counter-productive. But surely that
is not the actual lesson to be drawn. Surely the existence of these agencies
derives from the lack of employment opportunities-not vice-versa. And surely
the lesson to be drawn is that the kind of regulatory apparatus we now have,
structured in the fashion we're presently accustomed to, may be able to cope
with certain symptoms, but not with deep-seated disequalibria in the labor
market. Actually, I doubt that Mr. Hill seriously contends that his data support
a graver indictment-i-.e., that the law is generically incapable of- developing
institutions adapted to meeting these exigent moral and economic issues. Indeed,
the Sheet Metal Workers case,' to which Mr. Hill devotes considerable attention,
is itself a demonstration that, properly activated, the existing New York Commission can act with significant impact at least at the level of symptomology.
Now, having said that, there is, of course the very real possibility that
Herbert Hill is right in -the larger sense, namely, that we are talking about a
range of problems that are only partially, and haphazardly, within the effective
limits of the law at whatever level we are applying the law-federal, state,
municipal, or what have you.
And I suspect that this is true. I suspect that we are talking about problems which, since most of us gathered here are lawyers, we would like to analyze
and criticize in terms of how can we sharpen up administration, how can we get
more administrators-more mine inspectors as John Feild put it so well-and
get the job done better. But surely, when we are talking about a major reorientation of our economy, we are really talking about problems that go beyond the
scope of regulatory law as conventionally conceived.
We are looking, in short, for new kinds of initiative, not to supplant but
to supplement our ordinary regulatory institutions. Now, to give one closest to
1. Lefkowitz v. Farrel, C-9287-63 (N.Y. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 1964).
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the governmental standard, I refer you just by chance to the fact that Yale
University, under its new President, Kingman Brewster, has established its own
private equal opportunity panel. This panel-which is, I may add, still awaiting
the filing of its first complaint-is charged with the duty of adjudicating complaints about discrimination in the employment practices of the University, and
also in the employment practices of contractors working on substantial Yale
building programs. In short, we have a fair-sized corporation engaged in policing
its own employment practices and those of enterprises over which it has significant economic leverage. And this private apparatus supplements the existing
governmental machinery operative in Connecticut.
But all this, you may properly say, is just another form of governmental
mechanism--differing from standard models only in the sense that it happens
to be run by a nominally private entrepreneur.
So, you may argue, it is not enough to lengthen our stride a few
inches; what we must do is to walk in different paths up steeper mountains.
And in a very real sense this is incontrovertible: Today we have to devise new
techniques of teaching scores of new skills and disciplines-and we must radically improve existing techniques of teaching the established ingredients of a
good education. We have to accelerate the pace of our thinking about the impact
of automation on those already in the labor market. And-hopefully-we have
to plan the phased readjustment of a defense-oriented economy to one which is
at once more variegated and more generally productive. All these, surely, are
economic adaptations which are far beyond the scope of anything that the New
York State Commission or the Connecticut Commission can decree or that the
President of Yale or the President of the United States can by executive order
ordain and establish.
In short, we're looking for imaginative, creative action-public and private
-which requires legislation or money (and probably both) and which has as a
chief objective fitting people to the useful and rewarding jobs likely to exist one
and two decades hence. To revert to a single mundane example on the local
level I happen to be familiar with, New Haven now has in being a real retraining
program producing the kind of technicians John Feild mentioned the growing
need for. Under this program men and women, both white and black, who now
have neither skills nor jobs, are acquiring both in a matter of months. Today
this is a pilot program administered by Community Progress Inc. and financed
by the Ford Foundation. But if it proves itself-and there is good reason to
believe it will-I have little doubt that New Haven and hundreds of comparable
communities will, with federal support, undertake programs of this kind as longterm municipal endeavors. (Please understand that my frequent references to
New Haven are not solely the product of a parochial pride fertilized by wider
ignorance. My real point is that programs manageable by one medium-sized
city are duplicable by hundreds of others).
What conclusions do we come to, then, as to the effective limits of the law
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in dealing with the problems of racial discrimination in employment? We know,
from what Messrs. Hill and Feild have taught us, something of what needs to
be done to improve the fair employment practice commissions which are already
in being. The fact that improvements-very likely radical improvements-are
in order should not surprise us: after all, in terms of our political-historical
perspective, these two-decade old regulatory mechanisms are still very new. But
what of the apparent fact that all the innovations we can think of will not enable
these commissions to make serious inroads on the dearth of good jobs which
confronts millions of Negroes now in and shortly to enter the labor market?
When we reach the conclusion that we must, simultaneously, pursue far bolder
and far more comprehensive programs, are we saying that -the law as we have
conventionally understood it is ineffective? Not at all.
I think the more accurate assessment is this. The process we are witnessing
-and participating in-is the extension and ramification of law. Thus, I think
we can agree that chief among the antecedent causes of this conference is the
fact that ten years ago the Supreme Court decided the Segregation Cases. To
be sure, that was, strictly considered, law of a very different order from the
detailed and systematic regulatory legislation which is the focus of our present
agenda. That was law speaking in the simple, non-meticulous idiom of the
Constitution-law saying to government, "You can't treat people this way any
longer." But it was law which has implications far beyond that negative command. That negative command has forced back on all of us collective political
responsibility to go out and do affirmative things to right the ills of our democracy. That's why, at the national level, there have been -two Civil Rights Actsin 1957 and 1960;-and why this summer we will get a far more comprehensive
Civil Rights Act; and why, in turn, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will in three
or four years time seem ripe for amendment.
Paralleling this positive regulatory legislation there must and will be a
wide range of supplementary efforts, both public and private: poverty programs
in Harlem and Appalachia; Ford grants to community colleges in Yakima,
Sheboygan and Raleigh; self-starting neighborhood groups in Buffalo, Washington and Chicago's South Side.
It's very easy for us, as lawyers, to sit and devise better ways of structuring
existing political institutions such as the state antidiscrimination commissions.
I hope we do it. I hope we can follow this up by persuading legislators to bet
some tax money on it. I hope we can get some better legislators and some reapportioned legislators. (In fact, while we're talking about discrimination in
employment, perhaps state legislatures would be a good place to start widening
Negro job opportunities.) Better and more responsive legislatures can be expected to provide not half or three-quarters of a million dollars but five or ten
million to back up the efforts of a state commission policing a medium-sized
state.
It may prove far harder to move our political communities in the ways
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they must be moved to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in education and
retraining programs and the whole gamut of other necessary ameliorative programs. These, it seems to me, are the things we have to do in addition to the
things we are talking about tonight. I have no recipe. In closing I suggest only
that there is a paramount fact we cannot escape: as we enter the second century
of the Negro's emancipation the most important problem he confronts is how
to get back in the labor market.

